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NOTE
U.S. V. CRUZ: HUMAN SECURITY FOR WHO? OVERSECURITIZING THREATS POST SELL
Lily B. Jenkins†
I. INTRODUCTION
‘‘The liberty of citizens to resist the administration of mind altering drugs
arises from our Nation’s most basic values,’’1 because ‘‘when the purpose or
effect of forced drugging is to alter the will and the mind of the subject, it
constitutes a deprivation of liberty in the most literal and fundamental
sense.’’2 The fear of losing free will cuts deep into the American psyche-----a
psyche rooted in liberty and autonomy.3
It is possible that the potential for the infringement of personal autonomy
informs the Court’s reticence to freely allow forcible medication on
incompetent prisoners with mind altering drugs lest ‘‘sufficient
governmental interest’’ and ‘‘medical interest’’ become buzzwords, justifying
a slide toward prisoner mind control and behavior modification.
To safeguard an incompetent prisoner’s rights, in Washington v. Harper,
the Supreme Court held that if the decision to administer antipsychotic drugs
involuntarily is ‘‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests’’ then
‘‘the Due Process Clause permits the State to treat a prison inmate that has a
† Submissions Editor, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 10. J.D. Candidate,
Liberty University School of Law (2016). B.A. Communications, Thomas Edison State College,
New Jersey (2007).
1. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 238 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring).
2. Id. at 237-238. See also United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d 684, 691 (9th Cir. 2010)
(indicating that antipsychotic medications are designed to cause a personality change that, ‘‘if
unwanted, interferes with a person’s self-autonomy, and can impair his or her ability to
function in particular contexts. In addition to the intended changes in cognition and behavior,
the drugs can have serious, even fatal, side effects.’’) (internal quotations omitted).
3. In recent decades, mind altering drugs that override the will of a person have been
explored in science fiction movies and TV episodes underscoring the cultural fascination with
the loss of free will. See Star Trek: This Side of Paradise, IMDB.COM,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0708483 (last visited August 25, 2015) (describing an episode
where the crew of the Enterprise is dosed with a mind altering ‘‘happy’’ drug from the spores
of
an
alien
plant);
Equilibrium,
IMDB.COM,
http://www.imdb.com/find?ref_=nv_sr_fn&q=equilibrium&s=all (last visited August 25,
2015) (describing the movie, Equilibrium, which portrays a fascist regime that has eliminated
war through the suppression of emotions through the use of the mind altering drug
‘‘prozium’’).
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serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will . . . .’’4 The
Harper standard required that the inmate be ‘‘dangerous to himself or
others,’’ and that proposed treatment be ‘‘in the inmate’s medical interest.’’5
However, as Justice Stevens foresaw, the ‘‘reasonably related’’ standard set
the bar too low to protect the liberty interest of a defendant from interference
with his personal autonomy-----interference with his mind and will.6 In some
cases, courts have found a defendant to be ‘‘dangerous’’ based on the nature
of the illness rather than based on any imminent, specific threat.7
On June 16, 2003, in Sell v. United States, the Supreme Court raised the
bar.8 In Sell, the Court established that the government must meet a four-part
test in order to administer psychiatric drugs to a prisoner against his will: (1)
the governmental interest must be sufficient; (2) the state’s interest must be
significantly furthered; (3) less intrusive methods of furthering the interest
must not be feasible; and (4) the administration of the medication must be

4. Harper, 494 U.S. at 227. The standard for a forced medication to be ‘‘legitimately
related to penological interest’’ originated from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
5. Id.
6. Jeffrey J. Coe, Seeking A Sane Solution: Reevaluating Interests in Forcibly
Medicating Criminal Defendants to Trial Competency, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 1073, 1091-92
(2012).
Forcibly medicating a detainee under the Harper standard will likely be easier
than under the heightened standard of Sell. A detention facility seeking to
medicate a defendant under Harper can do so if he is dangerous to himself or
others and the treatment is in his medical interests. If the defendant objects, the
government need only prove its decision is reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests. A finding of dangerousness obviates the need for balancing
the government’s interest in bringing the accused to trial against the defendant’s
significant liberty interest in being free from unwanted medication.
Id.
7. Id. at 1092, n.175; see United States v. Muhammad, 165 F.3d 327, 336 (5th Cir.
1999) (finding defendant dangerous because her future physical or medical problems may not
be detected or diagnosed); United States v. S.A., 129 F.3d 995, 1001 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding
that the defendant’s violent hallucinations and prior violent behavior are enough to support
finding of dangerousness); United States v. Steil, 916 F.2d 485, 486-88 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding
violent delusions and threats sufficient to prove dangerousness even though detainee never
had opportunity to act on them).
8. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (departing from Harper’s rational basis,
minimal scrutiny test, and imposing an intermediate level of scrutiny. This heightened level
of scrutiny is more appropriate for the kind of individual liberty at risk.).
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medically appropriate.9 The government must prove each of the four prongs
by clear and convincing evidence.10
In the years since Sell was decided, the circuits have responded by further
refining the first prong of the test.11 Specifically, a ‘‘sufficient governmental
interest’’ is determined by weighing the seriousness of the crime against case
specific ‘‘special circumstances.’’12
The focus of this article is on the Third Circuit’s recent interpretation of
‘‘sufficient government interest,’’ specifically its method for interpreting what
can be classified as a serious crime. In United States v. Cruz, the Third Circuit
found that threatening a federal officer was serious enough for the
government to have an important interest in pursuing forced medication.13
The court examined whether to use the maximum penalty provided in the
statute or the sentencing guidelines to determine the seriousness of the crime.
Because Cruz’s crime would be considered serious under either rubric,
however, the Court chose to apply neither.14 Instead, the Court satisfied the

9. Id. at 167.
10. United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d 684, 692 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting
United States v. Hernandez-Vasquez, 513 F.3d 908, 913 (9th Cir.2008) (stating that the Sell
factors do not represent a balancing test, but rather a set of independent requirements, each
of which must be found to be true before the forcible administration of psychotropic drugs
may be considered constitutionally permissible).
11. Christopher Slobogin, The Supreme Court’s Recent Criminal Mental Health Cases:
Rulings of Questionable Competence, 22 CRIM. JUST. 8, 9 (2007) (regarding the first prong in
Sell, in order for a sufficient governmental interest to exist, the crime must be serious and the
governmental interest must not be lessened by the prolonged confinement of the prisoner).
The Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have determined a serious crime by using statutory
maximum penalties. See United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 237 (4th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Green, 532 F.3d 538 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Breedlove, 756 F.3d 1036, 1041
(7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 466 (2014). The Ninth and Fifth Circuits determined a
serious crime by using sentencing guidelines. See United States v. Hernandez-Vasquez, 513
F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Palmer, 507 F.3d 300, 301, 303---04 (5th Cir. 2007).
12. United States v. Cruz, 757 F.3d 372, 376 (3rd Cir. 2014) (‘‘It noted that Sell identified
two examples of such special circumstances: ‘(1) when the defendant has already been
incarcerated for a significant period of time; or (2) whether there is a possibility of future civil
commitment.’’’) (internal citations omitted). ‘‘Sufficient government interest’’ is the same as
‘‘important governmental interest.’’ See United States v. Sell, 539 U.S. 180 (2003).
13. Cruz, 757 F.3d at 386-87.
14. Id. at 386 (‘‘[The District Court] concluded that, under either rubric, [Cruz’s] crimes
were serious. We agree, and . . . need not decide here whether the seriousness of an offense
should be measured against either the statutory maximum associated with an offense or the
likely Guidelines range.’’).
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first prong of Sell by finding that Cruz’s actions posed a threat to ‘‘human
security’’ and the ‘‘very integrity of our system of government.’’15
The purpose of this article is not to contest that Cruz’s crime was serious.
Under both the statutory maximum and the sentencing guideline rubrics,
Cruz’s crime would be classified as serious.16 This article proposes, rather,
that the Third Circuit erred in using a vague standard of ‘‘human security,’’
which could lead to arbitrary rulings, ‘‘over-securitizing threats,’’ and
prejudicing the rights of incompetent prisoners.17
When faced with a mentally ill prisoner that refuses medical treatment,
the Court should adopt a threshold approach, first determining whether a
defendant is legally competent to make a decision to refuse medical
treatment, then proceeding to a Sell hearing, using the maximum penalty
available on the face of the applicable statute to determine seriousness.18
II. BACKGROUND
There are two pathways to forcible medication: dangerousness and nondangerousness.19 In taking the first pathway, dangerousness, a federal court
is not required to apply the Sell test to forcibly medicate a defendant if there
are ‘‘strong reasons for a court to determine whether forced administration
of drugs can be justified on . . . alternative grounds20 before turning to the
trial competence questions.’’21
Thus, if a Court finds that a defendant is dangerous, the Court may use the
Washington v. Harper standard,22 which is a lower bar, to judge whether
15. Id. at 387.
16. Id. at 376.
17. Yaniv Roznai, The Insecurity of Human Security, 32 WIS. INT’L L.J. 95, 122 (2014)
(‘‘The concept’s analytical weakness is especially manifested in three major challenges: the
analytically ambiguity of the concept; risks in over-securitizing threats; and the concept’s
illusory nature.’’).
18. Coe, supra note 6, at 1073 (evaluating the legal competence of a defendant to make a
decision to refuse medication and proceeding to a Sell hearing has the intended effect of
abolishing the lower Harper standard where the government can avoid heightened scrutiny
under Sell by declaring that a defendant is a danger to himself for refusing medication).
19. Id.
20. Sell, 539 U.S. at 182 (‘‘A court need not consider whether to allow forced medication
for [the particular governmental interest of rendering the defendant competent to stand
trial], if forced medication is warranted for a different purpose, such as the purposes set out in
Harper elated to the individual’s dangerousness, or purposes related to the individual’s own
interests where refusal to take drugs puts his health gravely at risk.’’).
21. Id. (emphasis omitted).
22. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1990).
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forcible medication is appropriate.23 Under the Harper standard, a Court may
authorize the forcible medication of a detainee if he is ‘‘dangerous to himself
or others and the treatment is in [his] medical interest[s].’’24
This low threshold is concerning. In United States v. Muhammad, a
schizophrenic defendant was found to be a danger to herself because she
refused to take medicine.25 This interpretation could lead to many mentally
ill defendants being considered ‘‘dangerous’’ to themselves, and thus allow
the courts to avoid the stricter scrutiny of a Sell hearing.26 With conflicting
reports from the medical staff in Abraham Cruz’s case, the district court
found uncertainty as to whether, in the future, Cruz would be a danger to
himself and others, and the Third Circuit accepted that finding.27 Thus, the
issue of Cruz’s forced medication was properly analyzed under the Sell
standard, the second, more difficult path, to forcible medication.
This second pathway for forcibly medicating an incompetent prisoner
applies in situations where the defendant is not a danger to himself or others.
In these cases the matter goes to a Sell hearing.28 The first prong of Sell’s test,
‘‘governmental importance,’’ is a critical point in the analysis. Governmental
importance is comprised of two components: (a) a serious crime, and (b) the
absence of mitigating special circumstances that would lessen the
governmental interest.29
The Third Circuit’s recent interpretation of ‘‘serious crime’’ under the Sell
criteria opens the door for arbitrary rulings.
A. Raising the Bar: United States v. Sell
To understand the context for the Third Circuit’s decision in United States
v. Cruz and its impact on the legal landscape, it is helpful to place it against
the backdrop of the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in United States v.
Sell, which burdened the government with proving four elements by clear
and convincing evidence in order to administer psychiatric medication to an
non-dangerous, incompetent patient without their consent.30

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Coe, supra note 6, at 1091.
Harper, 494 U.S. at 227.
United States v. Muhammad, 165 F.3d 327, 335-36 (5th Cir. 1999).
Coe, supra note 6, at 1093.
United States v. Cruz, 757 F.3d 372, 387 (3rd Cir. 2014).
Coe, supra note 6, at 1100.
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003).
Id. at 180-81.
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In Sell, defendant Charles Thomas Sell was indicted for health care fraud
and attempted murder.31 At the time of his indictment, the magistrate found
him competent to stand trial for fraud.32 During the pendency of his trial his
mental condition worsened, requiring hospitalization.33 After determining
Sell was no longer competent to stand trial, the medical staff at the federal
hospital recommended administering anti-psychotic medication.34 Sell
refused consent.35
Undeterred, the medical staff proceeded with administering the drugs
under authorization by the Magistrate.36 The district court ‘‘affirmed the
Magistrate’s order permitting Sell’s involuntary medication’’ finding that the
government had such a significant interest in bringing Sell to trial that
involuntary medication was warranted.37 The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed.38
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s decision and
established four elements for involuntary medication of incompetent
prisoners:39 (1) ‘‘important governmental interests are at stake;’’40 (2) ‘‘forced
medication will significantly further those concomitant state interests;’’41 (3)
the medication is ‘‘necessary to further those interests’’ and ‘‘any alternative,
less intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve substantially the same
results;’’42 and (4) ‘‘administering the drugs is medically appropriate.’’43
31. Id. at 170.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 171.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 171.
36. Id. at 174 (finding the government’s interest in bringing Sell to trial was ‘‘essential,’’
there were ‘‘no less intrusive means,’’ the ‘‘antipsychotic drug treatment [was] medically
appropriate,’’ and there was a ‘‘reasonable probability that Sell will fairly be able to participate
in his trial.’’).
37. Id.
38. Id. (finding the government’s interest in bringing Sell to trial was ‘‘essential,’’ there
were ‘‘no less intrusive means,’’ the ‘‘antipsychotic drug treatment [was] medically
appropriate,’’ and there was a ‘‘reasonable probability that Sell will fairly be able to participate
in his trial.’’).
39. Id. at 180-81.
40. Id. (emphasis removed).
41. Id. at 181.
42. Id. (emphasis removed).
43. Id. at 167. Notably, the last three elements of the Sell test had already been introduced
in Riggins v. Nevada. Id.; see Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992). The Sell court
adopted a new element, ‘‘important governmental interest’’ as the first prong of their test,
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The Sell decision-----specifically the inclusion of ‘‘important governmental
interest’’-----has had an ever-widening ripple effect across the circuits,
resulting in different resolutions.44 Seven circuits have directly quoted Sell’s
nebulous definition for a serious crime under governmental interest as
protecting ‘‘the basic need for human security.’’45 Other circuits have either
resolved the matter by looking to the maximum statutory penalty available
or by adhering to sentencing guidelines.46 Scholars have opined that Sell’s
overly broad definitions may have actually encouraged an uptick in the
incidents of involuntary medication and posturing by both the government
and the defendant.47
B. United States v. Cruz: A Case of First Impression
On August 8, 2011, Abraham Cruz ran an errand to the Social Security
Administration Office in order to discuss his benefits.48 At the office, Cruz
learned that he would not receive social security benefits until ‘‘a medical

modifying the previous standard. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180; see also Christopher Slobogin, supra
note 11, at 8, 9.
44. See Slobogin supra note 11 and accompanying text.
45. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180; United States v. Breedlove, 756 F.3d 1036, 1040 (7th Cir. 2014),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 466 (2014); United States v. Gillenwater, 749 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir.
2014) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 222 (2014), reh’g denied, No. 14-5266, 2014 WL 7010721 (U.S.
Dec. 15, 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 504 (2014). United States v. Cruz, 757 F.3d 372, 387 (3d
Cir. 2014); United States v. Gutierrez, 704 F.3d 442, 449 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct.
2380, 185 L. Ed. 2d 1094 (2013); United States v. Chatmon, 718 F.3d 369, 373 (4th Cir. 2013);
United States v. Mikulich, 732 F.3d 692, 696 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. Archuleta, 218 F.
App’x 754, 758 (10th Cir. 2007).
46. Coe, supra note 6, at 1084-85.
47. Slobogin, supra note 11, at 10.
Now that the circumstances under which forcible medication solely for the
purpose of competency restoration ‘‘may be rare,’’ defense lawyers and
defendants are more likely to claim incompetency, and defendants are more
likely to refuse treatment. In response, courts, prosecutors, and forensic
clinicians are more likely to take advantage of the Harper/Riggins exception to
the right to refuse and find that ‘‘dangerousness’’ exists in a greater number of
cases, and prosecutors are more likely to bring the highest possible charge to
ensure it is considered ‘‘serious.’’ In short, all parties are more likely to act
pretextually, with no deserved gain for anyone, since refusing defendants either
will still be detained (illegitimately) or will be released without adjudication
merely because they have refused treatment.
Id.
48. United States v. Cruz, No. 1:11-CR-00242, 2012 WL 3027809, at *1 (M.D. Pa. July 24,
2012).
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decision’’ had been made.49 He became agitated and yelled, ‘‘You’re going to
need toe tags!’’ as he exited the office.50
An officer on duty reported the incident to Agent Ryan in the Department
of Homeland Security.51 Agent Ryan called Abraham Cruz and asked about
his visit to the social security office.52 Cruz became increasingly agitated
during the call and ‘‘told Agent Ryan that he was going to ‘take [his] ticket
book, take [his] gun, take his doughnut and beat [his] ass.’’’53
Agent Ryan reported the conversation to Assistant U.S. Attorney Kim
Daniel.54 With authorization, Ryan called Cruz back, recording the phone
conversation.55 Cruz made statements such as, ‘‘There gonna be a war about
this; you should be concerned about yourself . . . If I’m gonna tell you I’m
gonna kill you, I ain’t gonna tell you I’m gonna kill you, I’m gonna swing at
you, all I gotta do is hit you one time,’’ and ‘‘why don’t you come see me in
person so we can talk and see whatever, so I can see what I’m talking to. Give
me a target, you have one.’’56 Based on that phone conversation, Special Agent
Ryan obtained an arrest warrant.57 Then Agent Ryan, along with eight armed
inspectors and police officers, arrested Cruz.58
Cruz had ‘‘‘previously received Social Security benefits based on a
diagnosis of affective/mood disorders and personality disorders.’’’59 His
sister, Yvette, testified that he ‘‘had been talking to himself leading up to the
August 8, 2011, incidents because he had not been taking any medication.’’60
The jury found Cruz guilty of two counts of threatening to assault and kill
a federal agent in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115.61 The three elements of a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115 are: (1) communication of an actual threat to
assault, kidnap, or murder, (2) someone who is a federal official, (3) with the
specific intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with that official while

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal brackets removed).
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at *1-2.
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engaged in the performance of his official duties or to retaliate against that
official on account of the performance of his official duties.62
After the jury found Cruz guilty, the government moved for a
determination of Cruz’s competency.63 Dr. William J. Ryan, psychologist for
the Federal Bureau of Prisons, concluded that Cruz ‘‘suffered from
schizophrenic disorder, bipolar type.’’64 After a hearing, the court found Cruz
to be incompetent; he could not proceed with sentencing.65
Nine months later, a second competency evaluation, prepared by Doctors
Weaver and Luking, concurred with Dr. Ryan’s report.66 The evaluation
revealed that Cruz refused to take anti-psychotic medication.67 The
evaluation stated there was ‘‘a substantial probability that [Cruz’s]
competency [could] be restored with a period of forced medication.’’68
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
entered an order authorizing forcible medication of defendant Cruz to
restore his mental competency in order to proceed with sentencing.69 In a
hearing pursuant to Sell, the court acknowledged that whether the
government has advanced sufficiently important interests to justify forcible
medication is a question of law.70 The court then found that all four of the
Sell criteria had been met by the circumstances of Cruz’s case.71 Cruz
appealed the court’s decision, taking issue with the court’s two-step analysis
under the first prong of Sell: governmental interest.72
The court first found that administering medicine in order to make a
defendant competent for sentencing enabled the government ‘‘to ensure that
the defendant receiv[ed] a sentence that accurately reflects the nature of his
offense and his individual circumstances.’’73 Second, the court found that no
special circumstances existed to lessen the importance of the government’s

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at *3; 18 U.S.C. § 115 (2008).
United States v. Cruz, 757 F.3d 372, 374 (3d Cir. 2014).
Id. at 374.
Id. at 374.
Id. at 374-375.
Id.
Id. at 375.
Id. at 375-376.
Id. at 375.
Id. at 376.
Id.
Id. at 376 (citing United States v. Wood, 459 F.Supp.2d 451, 457---60 (E.D.Va.2006)).
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interest.74 According to Sell, examples of special circumstances include the
length of incarceration and the likelihood of civil commitment.75
On appeal, Cruz had five arguments in response to the court’s findings.76
First, Cruz contended that the government’s interest in sentencing a
defendant was less than its interest in trying a defendant.77 Second, that
violations of 18 U.S.C. § 115 were ‘‘less serious than crimes . . . at issue in
[United States v.] Grape and Sell.’’78 Third, Cruz contended that the court’s
reliance on the pre-sentence investigation report79 (hereinafter ‘‘PSR’’) was
‘‘misplaced’’ because he did not have an opportunity to object to the
guidelines.80 Fourth, the PSR did not account for his mental health status,
which he argued ‘‘could serve as a basis for either a downward departure or
variance.’’81 Finally, he argued that the likelihood of his civil commitment
constituted a special circumstance undermining the governmental interest.82
In its analysis of these arguments, the appellate court elected to review the
lower court’s decision in accord with Mikulich and Dillon.’’83 The court then
examined the standard for ‘‘governmental interest’’ under Sell. ‘‘A court’s
conclusions regarding the importance of the government’s interest
necessarily involve balancing the seriousness of the crimes at issue with casespecific ‘[s]pecial circumstances’ that ‘may lessen the importance of that

74. Id. at 376.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 377-378.
77. Id.
78. Id.; United States v. Grape, 549 F.3d 591 (3d Cir. 2008); Sell v. United States, 539 U.S.
166, 166 (2003).
79. Cruz, 757 F.3d at 378 (noting that the guidelines had been calculated based off career
offender enhancement).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 378.
82. Id.
83. Id. (reiterating the Second and Fifth Circuits’ stance for reviewing governmental
interest is de novo and explaining the rules from Dillon and Mikulich); see also United States
v. Mikulich, 732 F.3d 692, 699 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. Dillon, 738 F.3d 284 (D.C. Cir.
2013). The Fifth Circuit gave a clear statement of the standard:
[W]hether the government’s asserted interests are sufficiently important [for
purposes of determining whether involuntary medication to render a defendant
competent to stand trial violates the defendant’s due process rights,] is a legal
issue subject to de novo review, while the other Sell factors for making such
determination involve factual findings which are reviewed for clear error . . . .
United States v. Palmer, 507 F.3d 300, 303 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Gomes, 387
F.3d 157,160 (2d Cir. 2004)).
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interest.’’’84 In Cruz’s case, the court created a patchwork from other circuits
to fashion a new standard.85
The Court relied on persuasive authority from another circuit regarding
the government’s interest in sentencing, refusing to ‘‘parse sentencing
proceedings from . . . substantive trial proceedings.’’86 The Court effectively
side-stepped Cruz’s argument that he should be held in civil commitment
until he regained competence for sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 4244(d).87
Thus, the court put the governmental interest in having a defendant stand
trial on par with competency for sentencing.88
Prior to Cruz, the Third Circuit had not established a rubric for
determining a ‘‘serious crime.’’89 Thus, the Cruz court looked to two other
circuit court opinions, which found that violations of 18 U.S.C. § 115
constituted serious crimes.90 The Third Circuit also relied on the opinion of
the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Gillenwater,91 which found that
violations of 18 U.S.C. § 115 should be regarded as serious crimes in order
‘‘to protect the very integrity of our system of government.’’92
In the plain error analysis under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b), the Cruz court
gave passing notice to the gravity of violating a person’s right to individual
liberty in a footnote.93 The court mentioned the rights of the defendant, but

84. Cruz, 757 F.3d at 381 (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 180).
85. Id. at 382 (‘‘We will thus adopt both the Mikulich burden-shifting standard and the
mixed standard of review set forth in Dillon. Such adoption builds on the standard set forth
by the Grape court and clarifies the extent to which defendants bear responsibility for proving
the existence of special circumstances.’’).
86. Id. at 384 (citing United States v. Wood, 459 F. Supp. 2d 451, 459 (E.D. Va. 2006)).
87. Cruz, 757 F.3d at 384 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 4244(d) (2015) which provides for the
hospitalization in lieu of incarceration of a convicted person suffering from mental disease or
defect)).
88. Id. at 385.
89. Id. at 376, 386 (‘‘Neither the Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit ha[s] promulgated
a test to determine the seriousness of a crime, but other circuits have looked to the statutory
maximum mandated for the offense or the applicable guidelines range.’’) (quoting the district
court).
90. Id. at 386; see United States v. Palmer, 507 F.3d 300, 301, 303-04 (5th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 238 (4th Cir. 2005) (concluding that violation of 18 U.S.C. §
115 is a serious crime ‘‘under any reasonable standard’’).
91. United States v. Gillenwater, 749 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2014).
92. Cruz, 757 F.3d at 387 (quoting Gillenwater, 749 F.3d at 1101).
93. Id. at 379.
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ultimately concluded that the ‘‘order authorizing the [Bureau of Prisons] to
forcibly medicate Cruz plainly meets [the plan error analysis] test.’’94
III. DID THE GOVERNMENT HAVE A SUFFICIENT INTEREST IN CRUZ’S
SENTENCING?
In order for the government to have a sufficiently important interest, the
crime must be serious, and there must not be present any factors that would
lessen the government interest, including the length of the defendant’s
confinement.95
A. The ‘‘Serious Crime’’ Standard
The Sell court addressed the criteria for a serious crime by stating:
The Government’s interest in bringing to trial an individual
accused of a serious crime is important. That is so whether the
offense is a serious crime against the person or a serious crime
against property. In both instances the Government seeks to
protect through application of the criminal law the basic human
need for security. 96
‘‘Serious crime’’ is not defined. The guiding language for future application
is ‘‘protecting the ‘basic human need for security.’’’97 This ambiguous
language left the circuits without a clear standard to apply, and many turned

94. Id. at 379 n.4.
We are sensitive to the fact that this appeal concerns Cruz’s ‘‘substantial rights,’’
in the colloquial sense. Indeed, we are sensitive to the significant liberty interest
at stake: Cruz’s interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of
antipsychotropic drugs. There are several dimensions to that liberty, which are
both physical and intellectual. Every violation of a person’s bodily integrity is an
invasion of his or her liberty.... And when the purpose or effect of forced
drugging is to alter the will and the mind of the subject, it constitutes a
deprivation of liberty in the most literal and fundamental sense. . . . The liberty
of citizens to resist the administration of mind altering drugs arises from our
Nation’s most basic values.
Id. (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. Id. at 376.
96. United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 237 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Sell v. United States,
539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003)) (emphasis added).
97. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.
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to using either the maximum sentence available under the statute or the
sentencing guidelines as a rubric.98
The Cruz court declined to take a stand on which rubric the Third Circuit
would use, claiming the case did not require a decision on a standard.99 It did,
however, acknowledge that ‘‘the seriousness of a defendant’s crimes is . . . the
yardstick against which the court will measure the governmental interests
that are at stake.’’100
Because the Third Circuit had not yet established a standard for a ‘‘serious
crime,’’ the court addressed the district court’s discussion of the two options
for evaluating the seriousness of the crime: (1) using the maximum penalty
prescribed in the statute, or (2) using the sentencing guidelines set forth in
the government’s pre-sentence investigation report.101 Under either formula,
the court acknowledged it had to account for special circumstances in Cruz’s
case to comply with Sell, which could lessen the weight given to the
seriousness of the crime.102

98. Dora W. Klein, Curiouser and Curiouser: Involuntary Medications and
Incompetent Criminal Defendants After Sell v. United States, 13 WM. & MARY BILL
OF RTS. J. 897, 909-10 (2005).
Left largely on their own, federal courts since Sell have used a myriad of
conflicting criteria to determine whether a particular offense is ‘‘serious.’’ In
United States v. Evans, for example, the Western District of Virginia held that a
serious crime is one that carries a maximum sentence of more than six months
imprisonment. The Western District of Texas rejected this six-month standard
in United States v. Barajas-Torres, ruling that under Sell only crimes against
persons or property can be serious, and denying the government’s request to
administer involuntary medications to an incompetent defendant charged with
illegal reentry into the United States. Also in conflict are United States v. Gomes,
in which the District of Connecticut allowed involuntary medications because,
in light of the potential mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years,
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon is a serious offense, and United States
v. Dumeny, in which the District of Maine denied involuntary medications
because even though it ‘‘carries significant potential penalties,’’ possession of a
firearm by a person previously committed to a mental health institute is not a
serious offense.
Id.
99. Cruz, 757 F.3d at 386.
100. Id. at 386; see also Sell, 539 U.S. at 180 (explaining that courts must consider the facts
of an individual case to determine the importance of a governmental interest, and by using a
balancing test, must weigh the seriousness of the crime against case specific ‘‘special
circumstances.’’).
101. Cruz, 757 F.3d at 376.
102. Id.
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The punishment for violating 18 U.S.C. § 115 is ‘‘a fine under this title or
imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years, or both . . . .’’103 Thus,
under 18 U.S.C. § 115, the maximum penalty was ten years, and Cruz’s presentence investigation report contained guidelines recommending
imprisonment of 100 to 125 months.104 The Cruz court found that ‘‘under
either rubric, his crimes were serious.’’105 Thus, the court did not need to
determine whether the ‘‘seriousness of an offense should be measured against
either the statutory maximum associated with an offense or the likely
[g]uidelines range.’’106 Effectively, the court punted on deciding which
formula the Third Circuit would use.
To support its assertion that the crimes were serious using either rubric,
the court cited opinions from the Fourth and Fifth Circuits.107 In United
States v. Palmer and United States v. Evans, the respective courts found that
18 U.S.C. § 115’s provision for a maximum penalty of ten years qualified a
violation as a ‘‘serious crime.’’108 However, aside from a statutory provision,
the courts also found the sentencing guidelines prepared for the case did not
have to reach ten years in order for a crime to be serious.109 In fact, the Palmer
court asserted that a crime with guidelines beginning at just over six months
in jail could be deemed serious.110
A jury evaluated the evidence and the applicable law and found Abraham
Cruz guilty.111 Thus, for the purposes of this article, it is not contested that
Cruz’s crime was serious-----but rather that the Court’s method of
determining that seriousness was flawed.

103. 18 U.S.C. § 115(b)(4) (2008) (emphasis added). One hundred months is equivalent to
8.3 years, and 125 months is equivalent to 10.4 years.
104. Cruz, 757 F.3d at 376.
105. Id. at 386.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. United States v. Palmer, 507 F.3d 300, 301-04 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Evans,
404 F.3d 227, 237 (4th Cir. 2005) (‘‘We believe . . . it is appropriate to focus on the maximum
penalty authorized by statute in determining if a crime is ‘serious’ for involuntary medication
purposes.’’).
109. Palmer, 507 F.3d at 303-04; Evans, 404 F.3d at 238.
110. Palmer, 507 F.3d at 304.
111. Cruz, 757 F.3d at 374.
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B. Did Cruz Have Any Mitigating Factors Lessening the Governmental
Interest?
Once a Sell defendant stands accused of a serious crime, the defendant has
the burden to demonstrate that the special circumstances of his case
undermine the government’s interest.112 After settling the issue of whether
threatening a federal agent was a ‘‘serious crime,’’ the court then had to weigh
the special circumstances of Cruz’s case that could mitigate the governmental
interest.113 In Sell, the court identified the following mitigating factors: (1)
lengthy confinement in a mental institution, (2) the possibility of future civil
commitment, and (3) time served in prison.114
The Cruz court agreed with Cruz that the special circumstances of his case,
namely that he had already been incarcerated for a significant amount of time
and he had a high likelihood of future civil commitment, were factors that
could lessen the governmental interest.115 But the Court found that even
though Cruz had been in prison for two years, because his violation had the
potential of a maximum penalty of ten years, there was still a possibility that
he would have to serve the majority of his sentence.116 Thus, the district court
concluded as a matter of law that Cruz had not been incarcerated for a
significant amount of time.117
Regarding the possibility of Cruz’s future civil commitment, the district
court looked to 18 U.S.C. § 4246 and 50 P.S. § 7301, which provide
prerequisites for civil confinement.118 18 U.S.C. § 4246 requires ‘‘a substantial
risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of
another,’’119 and 50 P.S. § 7301 requires a showing of ‘‘clear and present
danger of harm to others or to himself.’’120

112. United States v. Mikulich, 732 F.3d 692, 698-99 (6th Cir. 2013).
113. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003) (‘‘Courts, however, must consider the
facts of the individual case in evaluating the Government’s interest in prosecution. Special
circumstances may lessen the importance of that interest.’’).
114. Id. at 180.
115. Cruz, 757 F.3d at 377.
116. Id. at 376-77.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 377.
119. 18 U.S.C. § 4246 (2013).
120. 50 P.S. § 7301(a) (1978) (‘‘A person is severely mentally disabled when, as a result of
mental illness, his capacity to exercise self-control, judgment and discretion in the conduct of
his affairs and social relations or to care for his own personal needs is so lessened that he poses
a clear and present danger of harm to others or to himself.’’ (emphasis added)).
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Even though Cruz’s record showed a history of violence and threats of
violence, a competency evaluation in May of 2013 explicitly stated that ‘‘Cruz
ha[d] not posed a threat to himself or others.’’121 The court found it unclear
whether or not he would be civilly confined, and that uncertainty did not
diminish the governmental interest in sentencing Cruz.122
In so finding, the district court had to walk a fine line. It found that Cruz
was dangerous enough to require involuntary medication, but not so
dangerous that he would clearly qualify for civil commitment in the future.123
The court stated that the likelihood of Cruz’s future civil commitment was a
fact-specific inquiry, which would not be reviewed on a clear error basis.124
Thus, no argument Cruz made for mitigating the governmental interest
succeeded. The court found that neither the amount of time he served in
prison, nor his likelihood of future civil commitment lessened the
governmental interest in having him forcibly medicated.125
As for the differences between the government’s interest in medicating an
incompetent prisoner so that he can stand trial, versus medicating so that he
can be sentenced, the Cruz court punted again. It did not wish to parse the
differences between the two.126 The court emphasized the government’s
important interest in sentencing the defendant, but did not acknowledge that
the defendant’s liberty interest in remaining unmedicated during the
sentencing phase may be of equal or greater significance than the same
interest during the course of a trial.127 Ultimately, the Cruz court leaned on
121. Cruz, 757 F.3d at 377.
122. Id. at 377.
123. Id. at 388-89.
124. Id. at 388. (‘‘[T]his Court should review the District Court’s related legal conclusions
de novo and its fact finding for clear error.’’ (citing Dillon, 738 F.3d at 291)).
125. Cruz, 757 F.3d at 377-78.
126. Id. at 386.
127. Id. at 385-86. Donna Lee Elm & Douglas Passon, Forced Medication After United
States v. Sell: Fighting A Client’s ‘War on Drugs’------Part One, THE CHAMPION 26-27 (May/June
2008), https://www.fd.org/docs/select-topics/mental-health/forced-medication-after-u-s-vsell-fighting-your-clients-war-on-drugs.pdf?sfvrsn=6 (‘‘When the medication’s side effects
interfere with the defendant’s assistance of counsel or even talking to counsel (i.e., when it
renders the defendant a ‘zombie,’ sedates the defendant, or makes the defendant withdraw), it
impacts the Sixth Amendment . . . right to assistance of counsel.’’). See also Riggins v. Nevada,
504 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1992) (quoting William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors
Vote Life or Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1,
51-53 (1987-1988)):
As any trial attorney will attest, serious prejudice could result if medication
inhibits the defendant’s capacity to react and respond to the proceedings and to
demonstrate remorse or compassion. The prejudice can be acute during the
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the broadly worded standard from Sell to satisfy the serious crime
requirement to establish a governmental interest, finding that the
governmental interest in human security was sufficient.128
III. WHAT IS A SERIOUS CRIME?
Due to the lack of direction from the Supreme Court in Sell on what
constitutes a serious crime, the circuits are currently split on the rubric they
apply. The three criteria used to determine the seriousness of a crime as
discussed by the Cruz court include human security, maximum sentencing,
and statutory guidelines.129
A. Human Security
The origins of Sell’s ‘‘human security’’ standard are not clear. It’s possible
that it is either based upon a misconstrued concept of ‘‘ordered liberties,’’ or
upon an emerging global philosophy.130 But regardless of its origin, ‘‘human
security’’ is ill-suited to become a legal standard for measuring governmental
interest.131
‘‘Human security’’ lacks a clear definition.132 The phrase is amorphous and
broad. When the Sell court discussed the ‘‘important governmental interest’’
prong of its four-prong test, it stated that, ‘‘Government seeks to protect
through application of the criminal law the basic human need for security.’’133
Then Justice Breyer quoted Justice Brennan, ‘‘[The][p]ower to bring an

sentencing phase of the proceedings, when the sentencer must attempt to know
the heart and mind of the offender and judge his character, his contrition or its
absence, and his future dangerousness. In a capital sentencing proceeding,
assessments of character and remorse may carry great weight and, perhaps, be
determinative of whether the offender lives or dies.
128. Cruz, 757 F.3d at 387 (‘‘[Cruz’s] statements demonstrate the reasonableness of
concluding that the Government’s interest in preserving ‘‘human security’’ is as great here as
it was in both Sell and Gillenwater. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 180 (recognizing the Government’s
need ‘‘to protect through application of the criminal law the basic human need for security’’);
Gillenwater, 749 F.3d at 1101 (recognizing the Government’s need ‘‘to protect the very
integrity of our system of government’’)).
129. Cruz, 757 F.3d at 386.
130. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring)); Roznai, supra note 17, at 96.
131. Roznai, supra note 17, at 96. (‘‘[A]lthough human security is normatively appealing,
it suffers from numerous analytical shortcomings.’’).
132. Id. at 121.
133. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180 (quoting Allen, 397 U.S. at 347 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
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accused to trial is fundamental to a scheme of ‘ordered liberty’ and
prerequisite to social justice and peace.’’134
However, Justice Brennan also mentioned abuses to individual liberty
caused by governmental over-reach, specifically mentioning the plight of
‘‘innocent men convicted by . . . irrational or arbitrary procedures.’’135 This
omission by Justice Breyer is ironic, because the vague standard of ‘‘human
security’’ itself opens the door for arbitrary proceedings. Basically, any crime
could qualify.136 Thus, for incompetency proceedings, a standard derived
from the phrase ‘‘ordered liberty’’ and ‘‘social justice and peace’’ leaves much
to be desired.
It is possible that the language adopted by Justice Breyer is an appeal to
the emerging philosophy of human security in the international
community.137 Human security can be used to describe international
humanitarian interests, national security, or individual rights.138 But for
purposes of a Sell hearing, the concept of ‘‘human security’’ is too vague to be
a viable standard for determining whether a crime is serious.139 At a
134. Id.
135. Allen, 397 U.S. at 348.
Down the corridors of history have echoed the cries of innocent men convicted
by other irrational or arbitrary procedures. These are some of the alternatives
history offers to the procedure adopted by our Constitution. The right of a
defendant to trial-----to trial by jury-----has long been cherished by our people as a
vital restraint on the penal authority of government.
Id.
136. Klein, supra note 98, at 909.
The [Sell] Court also did not discuss any objective criteria, such as potential
minimum or maximum sentence, that future courts-----including the Sell district
court on remand-----might look to in deciding whether a particular alleged offense
is ‘‘serious.’’ Certainly, every crime is in some measure a violation of, in the words
of the Court in Sell, ‘‘the basic human need for security.’’ Further, the Court
quoted with approval from Illinois v. Allen that the ‘‘power to bring an accused
to trial is fundamental to a scheme of ‘ordered liberty’ and a prerequisite to social
justice and peace.’’ This statement suggests that the power to bring any defendant
to trial is a fundamental governmental interest.
Id. (citations omitted).
137. Roznai, supra note 17, at 121.
138. Id. at 113.
139. Id. at 121-22 (‘‘The threats that endanger human security are indeed grave but
seemingly endless: wars, drugs, organized crime, diseases, hunger, crime, terror, traffic
accidents, environmental crises, economic crises, and many others, all of which are covered
by the concept of human security. This wide and vague definition has lead critics . . . to ask:
what is not included within human security?’’). Judge Pollak called the phrase ‘‘human
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minimum, the ‘‘human security’’ language shows the Court has a low
threshold for what constitutes a serious crime, indicating unwillingness by
the Court to dismiss petty offenses.140
The Cruz court did not recognize this problem. It effectively dodged
adopting a certain standard for defining a ‘‘serious crime,’’ and reasoned by
analogy to other cases where ‘‘no less [serious]’’ crimes had been adjudged as
‘‘lurid and distressing’’ enough to ‘‘protect through application of the
criminal law the basic human need for security.’’141
B. Maximum Sentencing
The majority of circuits and the Supreme Court lean toward using the
statutory maximum penalty when evaluating a serious crime.142 In United
States v. Green, the court found that using the statutory maximum was the
most ‘‘objective means of determining the seriousness of a crime,’’ and thus
adopted that standard.143 In 1989, fourteen years before Sell was decided, the
Supreme Court in Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas used the statutory
maximum to determine seriousness of crimes.144
In United States v. Evans, the defendant was arrested for ‘‘assaulting,
resisting, or impeding’’ an employee of the USDA under 18 U.S.C. §

security’’ a ‘‘vague aspiration[].’’ Louis H. Pollak, ‘‘Original Intention’’ and the Crucible of
Litigation, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 867, 881 (1989).
140. Eugene Volokh, Crime Severity and Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90 VA. L. REV. 1957,
1979 (2004).
141. United States v. Cruz, 757 F.3d 372, 386-87 (3d Cir. 2014) (citations omitted); see also
Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 303 (1982) (stating there must be sufficient safeguards against
infringing on individual autonomy when administering a mind altering drug is at issue).
142. United States v. Breedlove, 756 F.3d 1036, 1041 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.
466 (2014); United States v. Green, 532 F.3d 538, 549 (6th Cir. 2008) (‘‘Moreover, the Supreme
Court has spoken on this very point in other jurisprudence. Whether a crime is ‘serious’ should
be determined by its maximum statutory penalty.’’) (citing Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S.
322, 326 (1996)).
143. Green, 532 F.3d at 549.
144. Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541-42 (1989).
In recent years, however, we have sought more objective indications of the
seriousness with which society regards the offense. [W]e have found the most
relevant such criteria in the severity of the maximum authorized penalty. In
fixing the maximum penalty for a crime, a legislature include[s] within the
definition of the crime itself a judgment about the seriousness of the offense. The
judiciary should not substitute its judgment as to seriousness for that of a
legislature, which is far better equipped to perform the task, and [is] likewise
more responsive to changes in attitude and more amenable to the recognition
and correction of their misperceptions in this respect.
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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111(a)(1).145 Then, in the following months, the defendant was also charged
with violating 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B), threating to murder a federal judge.146
The defendant was adjudicated incompetent to stand trial and subsequently
given antipsychotic medication against his will, pursuant to a Sell proceeding,
to restore his competency.147
When faced with determining a rubric to evaluate the seriousness of his
crime, the Fourth Circuit elected to apply the statutory maximum rubric.148
The court found this standard beneficial because it ‘‘respect[ed] legislative
judgments regarding the severity of the crime,’’ and gave courts ‘‘an objective
standard to apply.’’149 The court avoided setting out a ‘‘rigid rule as to what
the statutory maximum must be for a crime to be a serious one,’’ finding that
‘‘it [was] beyond dispute that the Government does have an important
interest in trying a defendant charged with a felony carrying a maximum
punishment of ten years imprisonment.’’150
Using the statutory maximum standard did not prohibit the Evans court
from complying with Sell’s direction to ‘‘consider the facts of the individual
case in evaluating the Government’s interest.’’151 The court still evaluated
whether the defendant had circumstances that would lessen the importance
of the governmental interest.152
A drawback to using the statutory maximum rubric would be apparent in
a situation where the government brings charges against a mentally
incompetent person, who cannot actually execute a threat. The wooden
145. United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 2005).
146. Id. at 234.
147. Id. at 235 (‘‘[T]he charge under § 115(a)(1)(B), a felony that carried with it a
maximum imprisonment term of 10 years, made the Government’s interest in bringing Evans
to trial an important one.’’).
148. Id. at 237.
Although the Court in Sell offered no guidance on how to determine the
seriousness of an offense, the Supreme Court has described ‘serious’ crimes in
other contexts. In Duncan v. Louisiana, [391 U.S. 145 (1968)], for example, the
Supreme Court observed that the Sixth Amendment’s right to trial by jury exists
only in ‘serious’ criminal cases. Id. at 158. It admonished that ‘the penalty
authorized for a particular crime is of major relevance in determining whether it
is serious.’ Id. at 159. . . . More recent right-to-jury cases have explicitly found
that the primary measure of seriousness is ‘the maximum penalty attached to the
offense.’ See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, [518 U.S. 322 (1996)].
Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 235. See also Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003).
152. Evans, 404 F.3d at 239-40.
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application of the maximum statutory approach may result in finding his
crime to be ‘‘serious.’’ The biggest criticism of the statutory maximum penalty
approach is that it does not consider ‘‘the specific circumstances of individual
defendants.’’153 As stated above, the Evans court obviated this concern by
evaluating the specific circumstances of the defendant.154
Another drawback is that state statutory schemes, which allow a judge to
sentence at minimum, mean, and maximum ranges, depending on
aggravating or mitigating facts. These schemes have come under criticism by
the Supreme Court because they may unjustly infringe on a defendant’s right
to a jury trial by virtue of judge-made-fact-findings that determine the
defendant’s ultimate sentence.155 However, judicial findings such as these are
equally if not more rampant in schemes that follow the sentencing guidelines.
C Sentencing Guidelines
The statutory guidelines provide a clearly defined and flexible standard to
apply to cases involving involuntary medication of incompetent prisoners.
Initially promulgated as a mandatory sentencing guide in 1984, the now
advisory guide for sentencing is 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).156
The factors courts must consider in crafting a sentence are: (1) the
‘‘nature and circumstances of the offense’’ and the defendant’s
‘‘history and characteristics’’; (2) the general purposes of the
Sentencing Reform Act; (3) the ‘‘kinds of sentences available’’; (4)
153. United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d 684, 691, 694 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting United
States v. Hernandez---Vasquez, 513 F.3d 908, 913 (9th Cir.2008)).
154. Evans, 404 F.3d at 237.
155. Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 307 (2007):
[T]he California regime runs afoul of the Sixth Amendment. The Court reasons
as follows: (1) California requires that some aggravating fact, apart from the
elements of the offense found by the jury, must support an upper term sentence;
(2) Blakely defined the ‘‘statutory maximum’’ to be ‘‘the maximum sentence a
judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or
admitted by the defendant,’’ 542 U.S. at 303, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (emphasis in
original); and therefore (3) the California regime violates ‘‘Apprendi’s bright-line
rule,’’ id., at 308, 124 S. Ct. 2531, that ‘‘any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury,
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt[.]’’
Id.; see Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
156. Sentencing Guidelines, 43 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 745, 745-46 (2014); 18
U.S.C.A. § 3553 (West 2010) (invalidated by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)
however, is still followed by judges as an advisory recommendation for an appropriate
sentence.)
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the ‘‘pertinent policy statements issued by the U.S. Sentencing
Commission’’; (5) the ‘‘need to avoid unwarranted sentence
disparities’’ between defendants convicted of similar conduct; (6)
the ‘‘need to provide restitution to any victims’’; and (7) the
applicable sentence range recommended by the Guidelines.157
After a jury returns a conviction, the judge makes ‘‘multifarious findings
of fact and [must] correctly apply . . . voluminous rules to those facts to
determine a guideline range,’’ before then applying the factors from 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) to yield the final sentence.158 In 2005, in United States v. Booker, the
Supreme Court held that application of the guidelines in a mandatory
capacity was unconstitutional.159 However, despite the ruling in Booker,
courts still turn to the guidelines to inform their decision. In fact, failing to
consult the guidelines can result in an appellate reversal.160
In United States v. Hernandez-Vasquez, the Court indicated that
sentencing guidelines were ‘‘the best available predictor of the length of a
defendant’s incarceration,’’ and that using only the statutory maximum
would risk ‘‘ignor[ing] Sell’s direction that courts should consider the specific
circumstances of individual defendants in determining the seriousness of a
crime.’’161 Even the Evans court that adopted the statutory maximum rubric
admitted that sentencing guidelines show proper respect to the legislative
process in determining which crimes deserve greater punishment.162
The sentencing guidelines are a flexible vehicle to assess the seriousness of
a defendant’s crime.163 This flexibility is particularly useful when considering
157. Id. at 746-47 (citations omitted).
158. Frank O. Bowman, III, Nothing is Not Enough: Fix the Absurd Post-Booker Federal
Sentencing System, 24 FED. SENT. R. 356, 356 (2012).
159. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); see also Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S.
817, 820 (2010) (‘‘We held in Booker that treating the Guidelines as mandatory in these
circumstances violated the Sixth Amendment right of criminal defendants to be tried by a jury
and to have every element of an offense proved by the Government beyond a reasonable
doubt.’’).
160. Bowman, supra note 158, at 356.
161. United States v. Hernandez-Vasquez, 513 F.3d 908, 919 (9th Cir. 2008).
162. United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 237 (2005) (‘‘A focus on a defendant’s probable
guideline range to determine an offense’s seriousness would . . . respect legislative judgments
. . . .’’). See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541-42 (1989) (‘‘The judiciary
should not substitute its judgment as to seriousness for that of a legislature, which is ‘far better
equipped to perform the task, and [is] likewise more responsive to changes in attitude . . . .’’’
(quoting Landry v. Hoepfner, 840 F2d 1201, 1209 (5th Cir. 1988)) (alteration in original)).
163. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 156, at 748.
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a crime such as threatening a federal officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115,
where the conduct of the defendant may be merely an empty threat, or
instead a serious threat where the defendant has the motive, means, and
intent to cause actual harm.
One criticism of the sentencing guidelines is that subjective considerations
lead to disparity among the circuits.164 The guidelines lack the level of
objectivity the statutory maximum rubric provides. Another criticism is that
the flexibility the guidelines purport to offer is predominately illusory.165
Further, critics have pointed out that the guidelines are not as deferent to the
legislative branch as a simple application of the maximum sentence available
on the face of the statute.166 Other scholars opine that Booker’s ruling did not
resolve the problems inherent in the sentencing guidelines.167 In fact, they
contend it may have opened the door for arbitrary sentencing.168
The rationale behind abolishing mandatory sentencing was that the factfinding accomplished by the judge during the sentencing phase was of equal
or greater importance in some instances than the fact-finding done by the
jury during the trial phase.169 This ‘‘absence of jury participation’’ created a
164. United States v. Breedlove, 756 F.3d 1036, 1041 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.
466 (2014) (quoting Green, 532 F.3d at 548) (indicating concern that subjective determinations
of seriousness lead to disparity among the circuits).
165. Bowman, supra note 158, at 356 (‘‘The . . . guidelines were criticized because their
many factual findings fed into a grid that subdivided the universe of possible sentences into
258 boxes, which critics said served largely to create a reassuring illusion of rationally
calibrated allocations of punishment.’’).
166. Marvin G. Pickholz et al., Constitutionality of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines------Blakely and its aftermath, 21 SEC. CRIMES § 10:4 (Nov. 2014); Brief for the United
States at 12, United States v. Fanfan, 149 F. App’x 517 (2004) (Nos. 04-104, 04-105) 2004 WL
1967056, at *12 (‘‘The Guidelines do not create statutory maximums. Rather, they are the
product of the Sentencing Commission, a body in the judicial branch. The Commission is not
a legislature and does not perform legislative functions.’’).
167. Bowman, supra note 158, at 360.
168. Id. (‘‘And the question of who gets the guidelines sentence and who does not will be
based far more on the personal predilections of the judge assigned the case than the particular
characteristics of the defendant.’’).
169. Frank O. Bowman, III, Debacle: How the Supreme Court Has Mangled American
Sentencing Law and How It Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 378, 418 (2010).
But the more factually specific and legally binding a structured system becomes,
the more judicially found facts will begin to rival the elements of the crime itself
in their impact on a defendant’s actual sentence. This phenomenon, which in its
extreme form has been characterized by the Supreme Court as the ‘‘tail which
wags the dog,’’ was felt by some to be suspect and perhaps illegitimate. Some
critics complained that according judicially found facts so much sentencing
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due process procedural deficiency Booker sought to remedy, but arguably
made worse.170 Because the guidelines are now only advisory, ‘‘trial and
appellate judges may become less and less concerned about accuracy [in their
findings.]’’171 In the wake of Booker, the statutory maximum standard is the
only remaining standard that constrains punishment, putting a boundary on
the highest penalty a court can sentence.172
The sentencing guidelines have also been criticized as ‘‘inappropriate.’’173
It is true that where finding a ‘‘serious’’ crime is the issue, the sentencing
guidelines seem capricious. Courts using sentencing guidelines have found
‘‘serious’’ crimes in situations where the guidelines have recommended
incarceration for thirty-three to forty-one months (for transmitting
threatening communications by mail),174 and fifteen to twenty-one months
(for possession of a firearm by a person found to be mentally defective and
committed to a mental institution).175 If a defendant’s crime can be
considered ‘‘serious’’ when the sentencing guidelines recommend twenty-one
months, thirty-three months, or one hundred and five months, then it is not
automatically apparent from the length of the incarceration whether the
crime is serious or not.
The Evans court criticized the guidelines for causing logistical difficulties
in the trial process.176 The court stated that the sentencing guidelines would
be an unpredictable indicator of the actual sentence a defendant would face
weight denigrated the constitutionally guaranteed role of the jury. . . . the Federal
Guidelines era conditioned federal judges to associate structured sentencing with
legislative and executive assaults on judicial power, acute manifestations of the
‘‘tail wags the dog’’ problem, and very high sentences.
Id. at 378 (internal citations omitted).
170. Bowman, supra note 158, at 357.
171. Bowman, supra note 169, at 468.
172. Jeffrey Standen, The New Importance of Maximum Penalties, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 575,
576 (2005).
173. United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 238 (4th Cir. 2005).
A focus on the probable guideline range as the barometer of seriousness would
shift this fact-finding to a time before the defendant’s trial or plea, before the
Probation Office prepares its report, and at a time when the district court has
already ruled that the defendant himself is incompetent. Fact-finding under
these circumstances-----with no PSR and with the defendant unable to testify or
render other assistance to counsel-----would be uniquely inappropriate.
Id.
174. United States v. Cruz, 757 F.3d 372, 386 (3d Cir. 2014); United States v. Gillenwater,
749 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir. 2014) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 222 (2014).
175. United States v. Palmer, 507 F.3d 300, 302 (5th Cir. 2007).
176. Evans, 404 F.3d at 238.
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and thus the guidelines were an ‘‘unworkable’’ rubric to determine the
seriousness of a crime.177
Despite the drawbacks of using sentencing guidelines, it is at least a valid
approach; particularly for determining seriousness for defendants who have
already been through trial and face involuntary medication in order to be
sentenced. At the sentencing phase the pre-sentencing report should be
complete. Thus, many of the logistical concerns regarding the amount of
information available to the court in order to evaluate a defendant’s
circumstances against the applicable guidelines would be moot at the
sentencing stage.
Under § 2A6.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the prosecutor
can prescribe an increase in the base offense if the offense involves conduct
evidencing an intention to carry out the threat.178 In other words, by applying
sentencing guidelines, a court could determine which statements are merely
empty threats, and which statements are threats the defendant actually could
carry out. The critics of the sentencing guidelines would argue that this sort
of determination belongs to the province of the jury as the finders of fact.
Simply put, although the advisory sentencing guidelines are a valid means
of determining seriousness, they have too many problems for the courts to
rely on them in the long term. In the future, a revision of the guidelines which
cures the failings of the pre-Booker system may be more appropriate to
measure a crime’s seriousness for purposes of Sell hearings.
V. PROPOSAL
Some mentally incompetent individuals are powerless to carry out their
verbalized threats. How should the court evaluate the seriousness of an empty
threat? Should those individuals be subjected to involuntary psychotropic
medication?
First, as a minimal scrutiny standard, the Harper analysis is inadequate to
protect the interests of mentally ill defendants, such as those who suffer from
schizophrenia.179 Accordingly, all forcible medication should be scrutinized
under the heightened standard provided in Sell-----regardless of whether the
defendant is considered to be a danger to himself or others.180
177. Id. at 238 n.7.
178. Andrew M. Campbell, Annotation, Construction and Application of § 2A6.1 of United
States Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1, 148 A.L.R. FED. 501(1998).
179. Coe, supra note 6, at 1093.
180. Kristin L. Henrichs, Forcible Antipsychotic Medication: Should the Mentally Ill
Criminal Defendant Celebrate or Fear Sell v. United States, 90 IOWA L. REV. 733, 764 (2005).
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Admittedly, this would make it more difficult for the government to
medicate defendants-----even if that is the best solution for a mentally ill
patient. A person suffering from schizophrenia is not likely to have an
accurate picture of reality, or the ability to make sound medical decisions that
are in his best interest.181 There is also potential for fraud and abuse: prisoners
could refuse medication to delay the trial or for other tactical legal reasons.182
A necessary preliminary step, then, is a test for legal competency to refuse
medication. Such a test, proposed by Jeffrey Coe, is ‘‘whether the individual
is a danger to himself or others and whether he is able to make rational and
informed treatment decisions.’’183 There is a line where a schizophrenic
patient may not be legally competent to refuse treatment-----in those
situations, the state’s interest in preserving and extending life should
outweigh an abdicated liberty interest by one under severe affliction by
mental disease.184 In sum, before a traditional Sell hearing is conducted, those
defendants suspected of being a danger to themselves or others who refuse
treatment should be evaluated to determine if they are legally competent to
make that decision.
Second, under the first prong in Sell, the U.S. Supreme Court and the
circuits should establish a set standard for determining the seriousness of a
crime. As noted above, the U.S. Supreme Court in cases not involving forcible
medication recommended using the statutory maximum as the guide for
seriousness. Currently, the majority of circuits use statutory maximum to
Both Harper and civil commitment analysis use a rational relation standard, not
taking into consideration many factors that the Sell test requires. This makes it
easy for the government to achieve its goals of forcible medication and
adjudication by stating alternative justifications. But the outcome is the same;
the government forcibly medicates the defendant and possibly infringes upon his
Sixth Amendment rights. If the Sell Court really wanted to make it harder for the
government to forcibly medicate a criminal defendant for trial competency
purposes, it should have applied the Sell test to all governmental interests.

Id.
181. Coe, supra note 6, at 1096, 1098.
The liberty interest in allowing an individual to make choices about his person
cannot be evaluated without looking at what choices are made. The decision to
refuse medication is a choice to suffer with terrible, though treatable, symptoms
of a disease the individual most likely does not realize he has.
Id. at 1098.
182. Id. at 1095.
183. Id. at 1097.
184. Id. at 1097-98 (indicating it is a good thing that the right to refuse medical treatment
is not absolute-----the government has a valid interest in ‘‘preserving life, (1) protecting
innocent third parties, (2) preventing suicide, and (3) maintaining the ethical integrity of the
medical profession . . . .’’).
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evaluate the seriousness of a crime.185 This shows deference to the legislature
in defining what the people consider serious.186
The remaining circuits that have either applied the statutory guidelines or
‘‘human security’’ should follow the model set forth by the court in United
States v. Evans. The Evans court struck the appropriate balance. It used the
statutory maximum penalty rubric to find the defendant’s crime was serious,
but it also evaluated the defendant’s special circumstances, which were the
length of confinement and likelihood of civil commitment, to determine if
the state’s important interest had been lessened.187
Nonetheless, this solution falls short of accounting for additional special
circumstances that could lessen the governmental interest, such as a
defendant’s medical history and the likelihood of the defendant actually
carrying out a threat. These factors could be more easily assessed by welldrafted sentencing guidelines. Until the problems with the guidelines can be
overcome, the statutory maximum coupled with an objective evaluation of
special circumstances is the best yardstick for measuring the seriousness of a
crime. It is far less arbitrary than ‘‘human security.’’
VI. CONCLUSION
There is an ongoing tension between the interests of ‘‘human security,’’ the
‘‘integrity of the system of government,’’ and the liberty of individual citizens.
In Cruz, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals refused to apply a solid standard
for finding Cruz’s crime serious.188 Instead, the court reasoned by analogy
and determined that Cruz’s crime violated the government’s important
interest in human security.189 Should this vague standard persist as the
measuring stick for governmental interest, all manner of conduct could soon
be deemed a threat to ‘‘human security.’’190
What kind of conduct is sufficient to trigger a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115?
The ramblings of a man off his medication for a few weeks or the hardened
threats of a career criminal? One kind of threat should be deemed more
serious than the other. A revised set of sentencing guidelines balancing
legislative, judicial, executive, and ‘‘citizen-jury control’’ affords the best
opportunity for courts to apply discretionary standards while avoiding the
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

See supra note 11.
United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 237 (4th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 239.
United States v. Cruz, 757 F.3d 372, 376 (3rd Cir. 2014).
Id. at 386-87.
Klein, supra note 98, at 909.
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vague and arbitrary analytical problems presented by ‘‘human security.’’191
However, until such a system is enacted, using the maximum penalty
authorized by statute is the best method to objectively determine the
seriousness of a crime. Ultimately, using either the statutory maximum
penalty or the sentencing guidelines would be far better than the nebulous
‘‘human security’’ standard.
As Justice Stevens said, the freedom ‘‘to resist the administration of mind
altering drugs arises from our Nation’s most basic values.’’192 Underlying this
191. Bowman, supra note 169, at 472-73.
As will doubtless be clear by now, I believe that the solution to the sentencing
problems that have vexed the Court requires a combination of Sixth Amendment
jury trial and procedural due process principles. The Court should adopt
essentially the following rules:
1. An ‘‘element’’ of a crime is a fact that, when proven alone or in combination
with other facts: (a) exposes the defendant to criminal liability; (b) sets hard
limits on judicial sentencing discretion; and (c) increases the defendant’s
punishment in the sense that it increases either the penalty a court may impose
or the penalty it must impose.
2. An ‘‘element’’ must either be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury or, if
the defendant waives jury trial, be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a judge,
or admitted by the defendant.
3. Within the impermeable upper and lower limits on judicial sentencing
discretion created by proof of elements, legislatures may create rules that channel
or guide, but do not eliminate, judicial sentencing discretion. Such rules may be
either voluntary, advisory, or presumptive. However, presumptive limits on
judicial sentencing discretion must be genuinely rebuttable and must provide
reasonable leeway for the exercise of judicial discretion to vary from the
presumptive limits, so long as the variation remains within the hard limits
created by proof of elements.
4. Flexible constitutional due process protections should apply to the proof of the
facts used in the application of guidelines. The precise constitutionally required
procedures for proof of such facts will be determined by the Supreme Court and
will, in general, depend on the degree to which the guidelines constrain judicial
sentencing discretion. Facts necessary to application of purely voluntary
guidelines (such as those in Virginia that judges are at liberty to ignore
completely) should probably be subject to minimal procedural requirements.
Advisory guidelines should probably be subject to requirements akin to those
now applicable to the Federal Guidelines. Presumptive guidelines should
probably trigger enhanced procedural protections in areas such as discovery and
confrontation rights, and perhaps burden of proof.
5. Federal Guidelines that trigger excessively narrow restrictions of judicial
sentencing discretion upon the proof of specified facts would be deemed to
violate the Sixth Amendment inasmuch as the guidelines facts in such a system
would too closely approximate true ‘‘elements.’’
Id.
192. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 238 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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discussion is the concern about government overreach. In cases where the
crime is non-violent ‘‘words-only’’ conduct, the government must be held to
a high standard to protect the liberty interest of Americans. It is disturbing
to think that a man with a history of schizophrenia could go off his
medication for a little while, go to the social security office to discuss his
benefit check, yell at the clerk, yell at an agent, and then find himself later
strapped down and drugged against his will. If this same sick man had yelled
at the customer service representatives at Verizon Wireless, or nurses at the
hospital, it is unlikely that he would have been criminally charged. It is more
likely he would have been involuntarily committed.
Are a few insults enough for the government’s interest to be important?
This is a burning question that must be given due consideration. Abraham
Cruz’s threats of beating Agent Ryan with a doughnut clearly falls below what
reasonable people would consider a serious threat, while his more volatile
language of ‘‘toe tags’’ and ‘‘target’’ and ‘‘kill[ing]’’ do appropriately raise red
flags.193
Of course, under either the statutory maximum or the statutory guidelines
rubrics, Cruz would have been found guilty.194 Therefore, questions as to
whether his violation should have been prosecuted as a serious crime under
federal statute is best reserved for a discussion on over-criminalization and
prosecutorial discretion.
Ultimately, the government should not have so much power that they are
able to forcibly administer mind altering drugs without first proving that it is
absolutely necessary and that it comports with the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The standard must be more than a violation of an
interest in ‘‘human security.’’ Otherwise, liberty will suffer a heavy blow.

193. United States v. Cruz, No. 1:11-CR-00242, 2012 WL 3027809, at *1 (M.D. Pa. July 24,
2012).
194. United States v. Cruz, 757 F.3d 372, 376 (3d Cir. 2014).

